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Metaphysical Causation 
Alastair Wilson, University of Birmingham & Monash University 
7th September, 2016 
Abstract: There is a systematic and suggestive analogy between grounding 
and causation. In my view, this analogy is no coincidence. Grounding and 
causation are alike because grounding is a type of causation: metaphysical 
causation. In this paper I defend the identification of grounding with 
metaphysical causation, drawing on the causation literature to explore 
systematic connections between grounding and metaphysical dependence 
counterfactuals, and I outline a non-reductive counterfactual theory of 
grounding along interventionist lines. 
 
1. Introduction 
2. The Causation-Grounding Analogy 
3. Cases of Metaphysical Causation 
4. Metaphysical Dependence Counterfactuals 
5. Metaphysical Causal Models 




 “Grounding is something like metaphysical causation.” 
        Schaffer (2012) p.122 
 “Ground, if you like, stands to philosophy as cause stands to science.” 
        Fine (2012) p.40 
 “I offer a treatment of grounding in the image of causation... ” 
        Schaffer (2016) p.96 
 In the quotes above, I think Jonathan Schaffer and Kit Fine have understated 
the intimacy of the connection between grounding and causation. The thesis of the 
present paper is that grounding just is a type of causation: metaphysical causation. I 
will refer to this claim as G=MC. According to G=MC, the grounding relation1 is a 
special case of the causal relation: whenever A grounds B, A is a (metaphysical) 
cause of B and B is a (metaphysical) effect of A. Grounding is a way of causing. 
                                                 
1 Perhaps neither grounding nor causation is strictly speaking relational, but is instead best 
expressed with something like a sentence operator; see Fine 2012. This issue is orthogonal to 
my argument. 
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 Making sense of G=MC requires us to draw a contrast between metaphysical 
causation and non-metaphysical causation—or, to coin a term, nomological 
causation. As I conceive it, this contrast is between two different ways in which the 
causal sufficiency relation can hold. If an instance of the causal sufficiency relation is 
mediated by a law of nature, then it is an instance of nomological causation. If an 
instance of the causal sufficiency relation is not mediated by any law of nature, then 
it is an instance of metaphysical causation. That the throwing of the stone is a 
sufficient cause of the breaking of the window is mediated by the laws of nature; but 
that the existence of Socrates is a sufficient cause of the existence of Singleton 
Socrates is not mediated by any law of nature. I characterize the notion of mediation 
in §5, in terms of the structural-equations framework I will present. Beyond that 
notion, the proposed distinction between types of causation relies only on the notion 
of a law of nature, to which most metaphysicians are independently committed.2 
Assuming that we antecedently understand lawhood, we have in hand everything we 
need in order to demarcate cases of grounding from cases of nomological causation. 
 
 Why think that grounding is metaphysical causation?—because of the theoretical 
unity and simplicity that ensues. G=MC has two major theoretical benefits: 
 G=MC is ideologically parsimonious. If grounding is just metaphysical 
causation, then we do not need a separate theory of grounding invoking new 
primitive notions. Instead, our theory of grounding will invoke only whatever 
fundamental ideology is employed by our best theory of causation in general, 
in addition to the notion of a law of nature.3 
 G=MC accounts in a straightforward way for the explanatory nature of 
grounding claims: grounding explanations are a type of causal explanation, 
and they work by identifying metaphysical causes. G=MC thereby supports a 
compelling unified theory of explanation, undermining counterexamples to the 
appealingly simple view (defended inter alia by Railton 1981, Lewis 1986c 
and Skow 2014) that all explanations are causal explanations. 
Contemporary metaphysicians typically adopt a Quinean methodology of comparing 
total theories, or ʻsystems of the worldʼ as Quine (1975) puts it. Given such a 
methodology, the having of a theoretical benefit can count in favour of a principle of 
fundamental metaphysics.  The theoretical benefits described above can accordingly 
form the basis of a prima facie case for G=MC.  
                                                 
2  For a closely related application of lawhood, see Hale & Leech (forthcoming). 
3 In this respect, my proposal resembles those of J. Wilson (2014) and Hofweber (2009), who 
argue that grounding claims can and should be accommodated using antecedently-understood 
ideology such as counterfactual dependence, logical consequence or conceptual inclusion. My 
version of their approach requires only counterfactual dependence and laws of nature. 
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The argument from theoretical virtue is not conclusive. To reinforce the case for 
G=MC, we need independent reasons to think that grounding has important features 
in common with more familiar forms of causation. Such reasons can be found in the 
systematic analogy between grounding and nomological causation, which is explored 
in §2-6 of this paper. Strikingly many of the important features of causal ideology 
apply across both nomological causation and grounding, and in comparison to the 
extensive commonalities between nomological causation and grounding, the residual 
differences between them look insignificant. The relations of grounding and of 
nomological causation have the same logical properties (which can be challenged in 
structurally analogous ways); the relations have the same connections to explanation 
and to counterfactuals; the same puzzle cases and theoretical issues arise when we 
try to give the relations a counterfactual analysis; and popular interventionist 
treatments of nomological causation carry smoothly over to grounding. The best 
explanation of these persistent parallels is that grounding and nomological causation 
are different ways for a generalized causal relation to obtain4. 
 
According to G=MC, metaphysical causation and nomological causation are 
different species of the same genus. This is something that my proposal has in 
common with a type of dualistic position defended by a number of recent authors. 
According to Jonathan Schaffer, the relations of grounding and causation are both 
species of the genus directed determination relation; and according to Karen Bennett, 
they are both species of the genus building relation. It is tempting to dismiss my 
dispute with such authors as merely terminological: for example, we could simply 
translate their term ʻdirected determinationʼ by my term ʻcausationʼ, and their term 
ʻcausationʼ by my term ʻnomological causationʼ. But there is more to the dispute 
than choice of terminology: where I posit a single primitive, Bennett and Schaffer 
posit two distinct primitives neither of which is reducible to the other. Thus their 
view ultimately has more in common with the views of authors like Fine (2012) and 
Koslicki (2015) who treat ground and cause as fully distinct fundamental notions. Of 
course, ideological parsimony is a notoriously vexed methodological principle (see e.g. 
Quine 1968, Lowe 2006, Paul forthcoming); in what follows, I invite you temporarily 
to suspend any doubts about it and to take seriously the ideological parsimony 
argument for G=MC.  
                                                 
4 Some of these parallels are also noted by Schaffer (2012, 2015). The conclusion of the 
present paper, which was written before Schaffer (2016) became available, is significantly 
stronger than Schafferʼs: I develop the structural-equations approach to grounding in service 
of my main argument that grounding is a type of causation, whereas Schafferʼs aim is the 
more modest one of providing a tractable formal model for grounding. J. Wilson (2016), 
which was also written subsequently to the present paper, offers a reply to the argument from 
the grounding-causation analogy to grounding-causation unity. 
 4
For those who remain uncomfortable with my terminological preferences, I can 
offer alternatives. Instead of using ‘causation’ for the genus-level term and 
‘metaphysical causation’ and ‘nomological causation’ for the species, we could use 
‘objective explanation’ for the genus and ‘grounding’ and ‘causation’ for the species. 
Then P grounds Q iff P objectively explains Q and this explanatory fact is not itself 
objectively explained by any law of nature; and P causes Q iff P objectively explains 
Q and this explanatory fact is objectively explained by some law of nature. But 
nothing much rests on this terminological choice. In the present paper I will continue 
to use ‘causation’ to refer to the genus, on the basis that labelling grounding as 
metaphysical causation emphasizes our prior conceptual familiarity with the notion. 
 
Some signposting is in order. §2 locates the target of the analysis—the grounding 
relation—and sets out the systematic analogy between grounding and causation. §3 
identifies some core examples on which to test G=MC. In §4, I explore the fate of 
key counterfactuals associated with metaphysical causal dependence, and discuss 
some apparent difficulties facing counterfactual accounts of grounding. I argue that 
these problems are familiar from the metaphysics of causation and that they can 
readily be handled by sophisticated counterfactual accounts of causal dependence. 
One interesting approach of this kind, interventionism, essentially involves the use of 
structural-equation models; in §5 I present a number of grounding models that are 
analogues of problem cases familiar from the causation literature. §6 discusses how 
these grounding models should be understood, and proposes a classification scheme 
for varieties of causation in terms of the source of the dependency. §7 concludes by 
summarizing the case for G=MC.  
 
2. Grounding and Causation 
First we need to get clear on exactly which notion of ground our analysis is 
targeting. In this paper we will be solely concerned with the notion of strict ground, 
which Fine (2012) distinguishes from weak ground. While that distinction will not be 
important in what follows, Fine’s distinction between partial ground and full ground 
will be crucial. It is worth seeing how Fine introduces the partial/full distinction: 
A is a partial ... ground for C if A, on its own or with some other truths, is 
a [full] ground of C (i.e. A, Ã < B, where Ã is a possibly empty set of 
‘other truths’). Thus given that A, B is a full ground for A v B, each of A 
and B will be a partial ground for A v B. Each will be relevant to the 
grounding of A v B, even though neither may be sufficient on its own.  
Fine (2012) 
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 Fine appears to intend his distinction between full and partial ground to be 
understood by analogy to the distinction between causal sufficiency and causal 
relevance. Two contributory causes may be causally relevant to some fact even 
though neither would be sufficient on its own, as when two people co-operate to 
move a heavy object. Accordingly, I will identify Fine's notion of full ground with 
sufficient metaphysical cause, and his notion of partial ground with contributory 
metaphysical cause. I will focus only on the metaphysical analogues of the locutions 
‘sufficient cause’ and ‘contributory cause’ to simplify presentation, and because these 
locutions correspond directly with Fine’s notions of ground, but the interventionist 
approach to grounding to be presented in §5-6 in fact generalizes to the whole of our 
causal discourse. We have a range of non-equivalent causal locutions—e.g. ʻis a cause 
ofʼ, ʻis the cause ofʼ, ʻcausedʼ—and the ability to account flexibly for this range is one 
of the main advantages claimed for the interventionist approach to causation by its 
proponents (e.g. Woodward 2003). I suspect that taking advantage of the distinctions 
enabled by this variety of locutions will also be of value to metaphysicians thinking 
about grounding. 
 
Most contemporary treatments (e.g. Rosen 2010) claim to take (full) grounding 
as a primitive notion. It is not always entirely clear what this means, but, at least, it 
involves not giving any reductive analysis of the notion in independent terms. 
Friends of grounding instead typically use non-reductive methods to help non-
initiates get a grip on their notion. As a preliminary step, grounding theorists 
constrain the notion of grounding by specifying its formal properties. The first 
question is the question of what sort of things can ground or be grounded: in our 
terms, what the primary relata of the metaphysical causal relation are. Following 
Mellor (1995), I will be working with the view that causation in general relates facts. 
I adopt this view for two reasons. Firstly, as Mellor argues, fact-causation handles 
cases of causation by absence much more nicely than event-causation does. Secondly, 
every instance of causation between events can be captured in terms of causation 
between facts: the fact that the cause-event occurred causes the fact that the effect-
event occurs. The reverse does not obtain unless we appeal to a very fine-grained 
theory of events, according to which e.g. the event of my cactus’s being thirsty goes 
proxy for the fact that my cactus is thirsty. My arguments below could be adapted 
to the context of a suitably fine-grained theory of event-causation, but I will set 
things up in terms of causation between facts. 
 
Thought of as a relation between facts, both partial and full grounding are 
usually taken to be partial orderings: transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. This 
provides an initial plausibility check on G=MC, which it passes with no difficulty: 
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the relations is a contributory cause of and is a sufficient cause of are likewise 
generally taken to be transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. However, it turns out 
that these logical properties can be challenged, in closely analogous ways, both for 
grounding and for nomological causation. 
 
Take transitivity first. The cases that seem to threaten the transitivity of 
nomological causation are cases of pre-emption where the cause triggers and then 
cuts off an alternative causal pathway to the effect5. Hall gives the example (Hall 
2004) of a hiker, who sees a boulder rolling towards them and ducks; the boulder 
passes harmlessly overhead and they survive. Plausibly, the falling rock caused their 
ducking, and their ducking caused their survival, but the falling rock did not cause 
their survival. As Jonathan Schaffer has pointed out, we can generate structurally 
similar cases to challenge the transitivity of grounding. Schaffer (2012) discusses a 
case of a dented sphere O, arguing that the dent in O grounds O having determinate 
shape S*, and that O having S* grounds O being near-spherical, but that the dent 
does not ground O being near-spherical.6  
 
Not only can analogous challenges be raised to the transitivity of both 
nomological causation and grounding, these challenges can be met in the same sorts 
of ways. Friends of transitivity for grounding and for nomological causation can bite 
the bullet, either by rejecting one of the intuitive causal premises (e.g. Paul 2000) or 
by embracing the counterintuitive causal conclusion (e.g. Lewis 2000). Schaffer 
(2012) proposes a contrastive treatment of grounding as a diagnosis of the 
transitivity failure; this treatment mirrors exactly his contrastive treatment of 
causation (Schaffer 2005). Interventionism, to be discussed in detail in §5-6, allows 
for the possibility of transitivity failures both for metaphysical causation and for 
nomological causation, while also letting us specify conditions under which causal 
relations will be transitive (Woodward 2003, p.79-81). 
                                                 
5 As far as I am aware, Nancy Cartwright was the first to draw attention to this type of 
example (in Cartwright 1979). 
6 A referee suggests that Schaffer’s counterexample is less persuasive than Hall’s, since it is 
less obvious that the dent does not ground the ball’s being roundish than it is that the falling 
rock does not cause the hiker’s survival. I agree with the referee on the relative strength of 
judgments here, but what is important for present purposes is the structural similarity of the 
proposed counterexamples. My own diagnosis of the relative strength of these cases turns on 
how strongly the supposed cause threatens the supposed effect; something’s posing a threat to 
an event tends to undermine that thing as a candidate cause of that event. Given the setup of 
the cases, it’s easy to imagine that the boulder posed a serious threat to the hiker’s survival, 
but hard to imagine that the dent posed a serious threat to the near-sphericality of the 
dented object. There’s accordingly more pressure to deny that the boulder falling is a cause of 
the survival than there is pressure to deny that the dent is a ground of the near-sphericality. 
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The asymmetry of nomological causation has likewise been challenged. One of 
Lewisʼs motivations for not building the temporal asymmetry of causation directly 
into his 1979 analysis (Lewis 1979/1986) was the desire to allow for the coherence of 
backwards nomological causation, such as might occur in cases of consistent time 
travel. For example, consider the case of a time-traveller who travels back in time 
and engineers the meeting between their parents that leads to their own eventual 
birth; the meeting is then a cause of the time-travelling, and the time-travelling is a 
cause of the meeting. In recent work, the asymmetry of grounding has been 
challenged in a similar manner. Naomi Thompson (Thompson 2016) and Elizabeth 
Barnes (Barnes forthcoming) have given several candidate examples of grounding 
loops, concluding that grounding is non-symmetric rather than asymmetric7. 
 
A first example of Thompson’s (adapted from Fine 2001) is the mass, density and 
volume of a homogeneous body. Each pair of these parameters is sufficient to derive 
the third parameter, and it would seem arbitrary to privilege any two of them as 
fundamental with the third being derivative. In response, we might well want to 
treat the values of each parameter as wholly grounded in the values of the other two. 
This requires giving up on asymmetry for partial ground, and accordingly also 
requires giving up on either irreflexivity or transitivity (or both). A second example 
of Thompson’s is the following truth-teller pair (see Cook 2011 p.474 for discussion), 
where the truth-value of each sentence is plausibly (via the principle that the fact 
that ‘P’ is true is grounded in the fact that P) fully grounded in the truth-value of 
the other sentence:8 
P: ʻQ’ is true 
Q: ʻP’ is true 
Again, the same sorts of response to these challenges to asymmetry are available in 
the causation and grounding cases. Probably the most popular responses will be 
either both to reject all putative cases of symmetric causation and to reject all 
putative cases of symmetric grounding, or to endorse asymmetry for each notion only 
when restricted to some more specific subject-matters. Neither of these responses 
represents any particular threat to G=MC. 
                                                 
7 Barnes formulates her arguments in terms of ontological dependence rather than of 
grounding, but many grounding theorists think of cases of ontological dependence as 
instances of ground. 
8 The sentences are either both true or both false; it’s an interesting question which truth-
values they have (and why) but not one that we need to address for present purposes. As a 
referee points out, this case also threatens either transitivity or irreflexivity; those who think 
grounding is non-symmetric rather than asymmetric must choose their poison. 
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 More radically still, some authors have recently argued that grounding is not 
even irreflexive (of course, if irreflexivity fails, so does asymmetry). Carrie Jenkins 
(Jenkins 2013) argues that a relation of grounding between physical states and 
mental states might obtain even in the context of a mind-brain identity theory; 
Jessica Wilson (J. Wilson 2014) endorses this line of thought, and also raises the 
prospect that identity itself—which after all is taken to be an explanatory notion 
within various metaphysical theories—might in fact be a grounding relation. But, 
once again, such revisionary hypotheses about grounding are quite compatible with 
G=MC, since we have no special reason to think causation really is irreflexive in 
these peculiar and recherché applications. Indeed, since the irreflexivity of causation 
has itself been questioned by appeal to the possibilities of a bootstrapping time-
traveller who is responsible for their own existence, of a self-causing deity, or of a 
self-causing concrete universe, these arguments in fact strengthen the grounding-
causation analogy. 
 
Thinking of nomological causation and grounding as different ways for a single 
notion of causation to hold does have some immediate consequences for the logical 
relationship between grounding and nomological causation. Assuming for the 
moment that the genus-level notion of causation is asymmetric, G=MC requires that 
the holding of nomological causation in one direction excludes the holding of 
metaphysical causation in the other direction. If A is a nomological cause of B, then 
B does not ground A, and vice versa. This principle seems a plausible one—at least 
setting aside exotic time-travel cases, and the like, which anyway threaten 
asymmetry of the genus-level causal relation. So this result provides G=MC with 
some initial, defeasible, support; the logical relationship between nomological 
causation and grounding is as G=MC would lead us to expect it to be. 
 
 Logical considerations only take us so far in understanding grounding. 
(Divisibility is a partial order on the natural numbers, but it is not the same relation 
as grounding.) Our grip on grounding is supposed to come in two other main ways: 
through examples, and through the connection with explanation. Nomological 
causation and grounding stand in the same distinctive relation to our practice of 
explanation: nomological causal relations and relations of ground each figure in 
explanations, without being literally identical to those explanations. When we want 
to explain why the bottle broke, we cite the nomological causes of its breaking; and 
when we want to explain why Singleton Socrates exists, we cite the existence of 
Socrates. This sort of distinction between causation and causal explanation is 
familiar from the philosophy of science, and it carries straight over to grounding. 
 9
 As Schaffer (2016) points out, nomological causation and grounding also bear 
similar relations to a range of metaphysical notions connected with explanation. 
First, to laws: we naturally think of particular cases of grounding as supported by 
general metaphysical principles, analogously to how particular cases of nomological 
causation are supported by general laws of nature. Second, to modality: Schaffer 
(2016, fn.5) endorses a global supervenience principle of effects/grounded facts on 
causes/grounding facts for both (deterministic) nomological causation and grounding. 
Third, to inference: under the right conditions we can be justified in inferring the 
effect/grounded fact from the cause/grounding fact. Putting all this together, the 
connection with explanation provides a striking further parallel between nomological 
causation and grounding. 
 
 A final—and rather more nebulous—point of analogy between grounding and 
nomological causation concerns their methodological status. Both notions have 
historically attracted suspicion from philosophers with empiricist inclinations: 
consider Humeʼs argument that causation cannot be perceived (Hume 1748), Lewisʼs 
campaign to account for everything in the scientific and manifest image in terms of 
his doctrine of Humean Supervenience (Lewis 1986a), Siderʼs aﬃrmation that “as a 
Humean Iʼm suspicious of metaphysical pushings and pullings” (Sider 2011 p.145) 
and Dalyʼs recent arguments that the notion of grounding is ʻunintelligibleʼ or 
ʻobscureʼ because it cannot be characterized in independent terms (Daly 2012). 
Relations of cause and ground are thought to lack clear content exactly insofar as 
they go beyond the uncontroversial notions (constant conjunction, supervenience) 
that they are supposed to explain. Here is not the place to properly evaluate this line 
of thought, although A. Wilson (forthcoming) explores one way in which it could be 
developed; it will suffice for present purposes to note that it further extends the 
analogy between grounding and nomological causation. 
 
 Thus far we have found nothing of consequence to distinguish nomological 
causation from grounding: they have the same general logical features, they come in 
analogous flavours, and they bear the same general connections to explanation. Of 
course, the analogy does not go on forever: the differences in what nomological 
causation and grounding depend upon gives rise to some differences between 
nomological causation and grounding down the line. I will discuss three disanalogies 
between them, which arise from their different relationships with the temporal 




 The most obvious disanalogy between grounding and nomological causation is 
that grounding is usually synchronic (it relates facts about some time t to further 
facts about t) while causation is usually diachronic (it relates facts about some earlier 
time t1 to facts about some later time t2.) However, I think that this difference does 
not run deep; some nomological causal relations may be synchronic and some 
grounding relations may be diachronic9. For example, if consistent time travel is 
possible then a time-traveller’s pressing a button at t to travel back in time and 
present their former self with a freshly-printed set of time-machine blueprints may be 
a cause of another event that also occurs at t: the existence of some well-used and 
dog-eared blueprints. And any cases of gravitational or quantum action at a distance 
would (at least on some interpretations) count as synchronic causation. Conversely, 
my being human as opposed to being a swampman may be grounded in my past 
causal history, and my present ability to refer to Montana may be grounded in my 
past causal interaction with Montana. Still, most cases of nomological causation are 
diachronic while most cases of metaphysical causation are synchronic, and the 
current proposal can account for this fact in a satisfying way. Recall that on the 
present proposal, nomological causal dependencies are mediated by the laws of 
nature. Since the laws of nature typically relate events at one time to events at 
another, it is then to be expected that nomological causal dependencies should by 
and large be diachronic. And since metaphysical causal dependencies are not 
mediated by any laws of nature (instead being mediated by principles of logic or 
metaphysics that do not typically impose diachronic constraints) it is to be expected 
that metaphysical causal dependencies should by and large be synchronic. 
 
 Nomological causation and grounding also appear to differ in their relationship 
with concrete dynamical processes. Nomological causation is widely assumed to have 
a special relationship with concrete physical processes which transfer marks, or mass-
energy, or some other conserved physical quantity. Sometimes this relationship is 
exploited to construct a full-fledged theory of causation, for example by Fair (1979), 
Salmon (1984) and Dowe (1992). But even defenders of alternative counterfactual or 
probabilistic approaches to causation are likely to agree that nomological causation 
stands in some special relationship to concrete physical processes, while grounding 
does not. This is exactly as would be predicted by my proposal for demarcating 
nomological causation from metaphysical causation. Since nomological causal 
dependencies are mediated by laws of nature while metaphysical causal dependencies 
do not, it is entirely unsurprising that claims about actual nomological causal 
dependencies have consequences for actual law-governed natural processes while 
claims about actual metaphysical causal dependencies have no such consequences. 
                                                 
9 For discussion of more examples of these sorts, see (Wilson MS). 
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 While some conceptions of the special relationship between causation and 
physical processes might be inimical to G=MC, there is a widespread and popular 
conception of this relationship that is fully congenial to G=MC. That is the dualistic 
view defended by Hall (2004), who argues that we have two basic and different 
notions of causation: causal production and causal dependence. Causal dependence is 
a matter of the right patterns of counterfactuals; causal production is a distinctively 
dynamical way that causal dependence might obtain. Crucially, though, there are 
other ways that causal dependence might obtain; dependence need not go via 
production. Hall motivates this distinction by appeal to cases of causation by absence 
and cases of double prevention (see §5); it is also a natural fit for friends of G=MC. 
Cases of metaphysical causation are amongst those cases in which causal dependence 
does not go via causal production. 
 
 Grounding is also thought to have a special connection to fundamentality: a 
grounding fact is supposed to be more fundamental than any facts it grounds, and 
something is fundamental iff it is ungrounded (Bennett forthcoming). Nomological 
causation is not usually seen as connected to fundamentality in this way (although 
Bennett demurs). However, this observation poses no threat to G=MC. Nomological 
causation is typically connected in an analogous way to an analogous ordering: the 
temporal ordering. (And, as already noted, there are parallel challenges to the claims 
that grounding partially orders events with respect to fundamentality and that 
nomological causation partially orders events with respect to time.) I have suggested 
that the difference between nomological causation and grounding should be traced to 
a difference between how the dependencies are mediated. Dependencies between facts 
about different times are typically mediated by the laws of nature, while 
dependencies between facts about different levels of reality are typically not 
mediated by the laws. This suggestion explains why nomological causal connections 
typically structure the world with respect to time, while metaphysical causal 
connections typically structure the world with respect to fundamentality. 
 
 Part of the orthodox view of ground is grounding necessitarianism: the principle 
that full grounds necessitate the facts they ground. While this is a standard principle 
of ground, validated within the systems of e.g. Fine and Schaffer, it has been 
challenged by a number of authors. Leuenberger (2014) and Skiles (2015) have 
argued directly against it. Parsons (1999) and Briggs (2012b) have argued that the 
relation of truthmaking does not entail the corresponding strict conditional; so if 
truthmaking is a kind of full grounding then these authors deny that full grounds 
always necessitate. For the purposes of this paper, I can remain neutral on grounding 
necessitarianism. Still, it is plausible that full grounds at least sometimes necessitate 
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the facts they ground, while sufficient nomological causes at least sometimes do not. 
Fortunately, this distinction between metaphysical causation and nomological 
causation is predicted by G=MC in conjunction with the demarcation criterion 
proposed above. Given the widespread assumption that laws of nature are 
metaphysically contingent, then a failure of necessitation for nomological causation is 
just what we should expect; if an instance of a dependency relation is mediated by a 
contingent fact, then there is no barrier to the possibility of the cause obtaining 
without the effect obtaining. Instances of metaphysical causation in contrast are not 
typically mediated by any contingent fact; it is then entirely to be expected that the 
grounding fact necessitates the grounded fact. 
 
3. Cases of Metaphysical Causation 
 Further explication of grounding tends to go by way of example, and the recent 
literature contains a rich and diverse diet of cases. Here is a representative sample: 
Singleton: The existence of Socrates grounds the existence of singleton Socrates. 
Double-negation: The truth of P grounds the truth of ¬¬P. 
Disjunction: The truth of P grounds the truth of P⋁Q. 
Conjunction: The truth of P grounds the truth of P&Q. 
Truthmaking: The existence of Socrates grounds the truth of ʻSocrates existsʼ. 
Mind/body: My being in brain state B grounds my being in mental state M. 
Part/whole: The existence of my head grounds my existence. 
Act-Consequentialism: Act Aʼs having the best consequences grounds Aʼs 
being right.  
Euthyphro: Godʼs desiring that P grounds its being good that P. 
Noether: The symmetry of the laws of nature under time-translation grounds 
the fact that energy is a conserved quantity. 
Since these cases are so different from one another, there is plenty of scope to deny 
that they are all genuine instances of grounding. For example, we could follow 
Ramsey (1927) in thinking ¬¬P just a notational variant on P, and deny Double-
negation. Identity theorists deny Mind/Body. And of course, deontologists deny Act-
Consequentialism and non-theists deny Euthyphro. Accordingly, it is not necessary 
or even desirable that a theory of grounding should entail that each one of these 
examples is a genuine case of grounding. But a theory of grounding ought to 
underwrite these grounding claims at least in the context of the background 
assumptions that have typically motivated their defenders; otherwise, the theory 
could reasonably be accused of changing the subject. 
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 Armed with the distinction between full ground and partial ground, understood 
by analogy with sufficient cause and contributory cause, we can readily see that 
some of our cases correspond to full ground and others to partial ground. Plausibly 
Singleton, Double-Negation, Disjunction, Truthmaking, Mind/Body, Act-
Consequentialism, Euthyphro and Noether are cases of full grounding (sufficient 
metaphysical causation) and Conjunction and Part/Whole are cases of partial 
grounding (contributory metaphysical causation). However, a case could be made 
that (say) Truthmaking and Euthyphro are in fact cases of partial ground: in 
addition to the worldly facts, we may need to add in facts about meanings in English 
and facts about non-existence of other gods before they give us cases of full ground. 
For simplicity, I will focus on the remaining, less controversial, cases of full ground. 
 
G=MC allows for a wide variety of kinds of fact amongst the causal relata. Our 
examples involve facts about concrete entities (Socrates), facts about abstract 
entities (Singleton Socrates), and facts about entities which are neither clearly 
abstract nor clearly concrete (God, laws of nature). Consequently G=MC falsifies the 
familiar thought that abstract objects are outside the causal order.10 How bad is this 
result? It is widely (although not universally) held that abstracta do not enter into 
causal relations. Indeed, acausality is one of the criteria that David Lewis considers 
when seeking to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction (Lewis 1986b). But as 
I see it, the primary motivation for thinking that abstract objects are acausal is that 
abstract objects fail to engage in the kinds of activity which can sustain causal 
production (see p.11). Abstracta do not have mass or couple to quantum fields. Will 
we then propose new dynamical theories for abstract objects, positing metaphysical 
forces between them, to sustain metaphysical causation? No; a parallel physics of 
abstracta is a bad plan. But we can do full justice to this thought via a prohibition 
on abstract causal production, while still allowing for abstract causal dependence. 
Causal dependence need not rest on any productive connection between cause and 
effect: a classic example of this is causation by omission. But more generally, we can 
go along with Hall’s denial that dependence need go via production, and interpret 
G=MC accordingly: we identify grounding with metaphysical causal dependence 
rather than with metaphysical causal production.11 Metaphysical causation need not 
involve any form of causal production—no metaphysical ‘biff’!—but it does need to 
involve characteristically causal patterns of counterfactual dependence. 
                                                 
10 Versions of this argument could be run with respect to specific kinds of abstract objects 
(such as sets), or with respect to some characteristic feature of some abstract objects (such as 
lack of spatial location). My response will also apply to these variant arguments. 
11 This response could alternatively be made out by appeal to a flavour of causal pluralism 
other than Hall’s: see, for example, Sober (1985), Hitchcock (2003), Cartwright (2004), Psillos 
(2009), Godfrey-Smith (2010), Strevens (2013). 
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It is also worth noting that causation simpliciter is often not seen as restricted to 
causation amongst concreta; for example, God’s act of bringing the world into 
existence (and time along with it) is pretty widely taken to be a potential case of 
causation, even though it is not obviously a case of causation amongst concreta. 
Likewise, a restriction of ‘causation’ to refer to causation amongst concreta would 
render Amie Thomasson’s influential defence12 of the view that works of art are 
created abstract objects (as well as the Cartesian dualist view that minds are non-
concrete objects with causal powers) as just conceptually or linguistically confused. 
However, I don’t need to rest too much on the conceptual coherence of any 
particular cases of causation involving abstracta. What I am arguing is that the 
general notion of causal dependence is conceptually separable from its particular 
application to concrete objects, events, and states of affairs. 
 
These various manoeuvres may seem to miss the point. Doesn’t intuition tell us 
directly that grounding is not a type of causation? A distinguished anticipation of 
this objection can be found in Kim (1973), who influentially criticized Lewisʼs theory 
of causation for not adequately distinguishing counterfactual dependence in virtue of 
causation from counterfactual dependence in virtue of two events overlapping and 
hence sharing a common part. Kim took it to be intuitively obvious that 
counterfactual dependencies deriving from overlap should not count as causation. 
Other similar objections maintain that it is intuitively obvious that causation must 
hold between events at different times, or between events with spatial extension. 
 
Objections from direct intuition can be resisted either by denying the evidential 
force of intuitions in the relevant domain, or by arguing that we do not in fact have 
the alleged intuitions. Examples of the former strategy include David Wallace on 
objective chance (Wallace 2012) and Alastair Wilson on laws of nature (A. Wilson 
2013), and examples of the latter include Sydney Shoemaker on laws of nature 
(Shoemaker 1980, 1998) and Robert Williams on gunk (Williams 2006). Both 
strategies seem applicable to our intuitions concerning grounding and causation. We 
could maintain that the relevant issues are simply too highly theoretical and abstract 
for intuition to carry weight: nothing in our evolutionary history, one might argue, 
has adapted us to be accurate in our intuitions about fundamental ideological notions 
within metaphysics. Alternatively, we can offer nomological causation—the type of 
causal dependencies that themselves depend on the laws of nature—as the source of 
our problematic intuitions, saying that we mistake intuitions about nomological 
causation for intuitions about causation in general. Such a mistake might be 
unsurprising, given the prominence of nomological causation in our everyday lives.  
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Thomasson (1999, 2007). 
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One way of pushing the challenge from intuition would be to insist that the term 
‘causation’, as it is generally used, analytically excludes cases of grounding. If this is 
so, then defenders of G=MC are simply misunderstanding the terms they use. But 
this is a dangerous line of thought: it threatens to make taxonomic progress in 
science impossible. Compare: if everyone believes that all dinosaurs were in fact scaly 
lizard-like things, then everyone will be inclined to take the extension of ‘dinosaurs’ 
as it occurs in “birds are a type of dinosaur” to include only scaly lizard-like things. 
But we should not conclude that the hypothesis that birds are a type of dinosaur is 
confused, contradictory or analytically false. Instead, that birds are dinosaurs is a 
perfectly reasonable revisionary taxonomic hypothesis, one that contemporary 
palaeontologists take seriously. What a palaeontologist who floats this hypothesis is 
suggesting is that, in order to optimize our classificatory scheme, we should expand 
our category ‘dinosaur’ to include birds. I am proposing G=MC in the same spirit. 
 
We have seen some putative cases of metaphysical causation, and addressed some 
initial objections to G=MC that arise from them. In the next section, we will use our 
cases to draw out a systematic connection between grounding and counterfactuals. 
 
4. Metaphysical Dependence Counterfactuals 
The simplest counterfactual analysis of causation is the early theory of Lewis 
(1973)13. Lewis defines causation as the ancestral of counterfactual dependence, 
where counterfactual dependence of P on Q requires the truth of ¬Q □→ ¬P. Here 
are the Lewisian counterfactuals corresponding to our examples of full ground14: 
CF-Singleton: If Socrates had not existed, nor would have Singleton Socrates. 
CF-Double-negation: If P had not been true, nor would ¬¬P have been. 
CF-Disjunction: If P had not been true, nor would P⋁Q have been. 
CF-Mind/body: If I had not been in brain state B, I would not have been in 
mental state M. 
CF-Act-consequentialism: If act A had not had the best consequences, A 
would not have been right. 
CF-Euthyphro:  If God had not desired that P, P would not have been good. 
CF-Noether: If the laws of nature had not been symmetric under time-
translation, then energy would not have been a conserved quantity. 
                                                 
13 Lewis’s account draws directly on one of Humeʼs ʻtwo definitions of causeʼ (Hume 1748). 
14 These examples are posed in the past tense (had not) instead of the present tense (were not 
to). I think this makes judgments clearer without affecting any substantive issues. 
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Some of these counterfactuals seem fine: for example, CF-Singleton, CF-Double-
negation, and CF-Noether. This suggests we are on the right track. But it looks like 
there are potential problems with others of them, of two different kinds: 
 Some of the antecedents may be metaphysically impossible (as in the case of 
CF-Euthyphro, or of CF-Double-Negation for any necessarily true P), in 
which case those counterfactuals are counterpossibles.  
 Some of the counterfactuals seem to have the wrong truth-conditions. For 
example, CF-Disjunction looks false: if P had not been true, P⋁Q might still 
have been true (e.g. if Q were true). And CF-Mind/Body looks false also: 
perhaps if I had not been in brain state B, I might have been in a very 
similar state B*, in which case I would still have been in mental state M.15 
The first issue is discussed in a companion paper (A. Wilson forthcoming) and is 
mostly set aside here. For the purposes of this paper I will be assuming (with 
Brogaard & Salerno, Fine, Goodman, Kment, Nolan, Priest, et al.)16 that we can 
ascribe non-trivial truth-conditions even to counterfactuals with metaphysically 
impossible antecedents. (For further defence of this assumption, see §6.) The second 
issue will be handled by the interventionist approach to be introduced later in this 
section; for more details on how this works, see the discussions of symmetric 
overdetermination in §5 and of causal proportionality later on in this section. In the 
meantime, we have a more urgent issue to confront. Even if the CF counterfactuals 
do hold, there might nevertheless fail to be metaphysical causal dependence as a 
result of the unwanted truth of some additional counterfactuals. 
 
 Since grounding is usually asymmetric, if G=MC is correct then metaphysical 
causal dependence must likewise usually be asymmetric. Therefore, in addition to the 
holding of a given CF counterfactual, a simple counterfactual account of 
metaphysical causation will typically require the failure to hold of the corresponding 
RCF counterfactual: 
RCF-Singleton: If Singleton Socrates had not existed, Socrates would not have 
existed either. 
RCF-Double-negation: If ¬¬P had not been true, P would not have been true 
either. 
RCF-Disjunction: If P⋁Q had not been true, P would not have been true 
either. 
                                                 
15 See Yablo (2004) and Menzies & List (2009) for more discussion. 
16 See e.g. Brogaard & Salerno (2007), Goodman (2004), Kment (2006), Nolan (1997), Priest 
(2005). 
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RCF-Mind/body: If I had not been in mental state M, I would not have been 
in brain state B.  
RCF-Act-consequentialism: If act A had not been right, it would not have 
had the best consequences. 
RCF-Euthyphro: If P had not been good, God would not have desired it. 
RCF-Noether: If energy had not been a conserved quantity, the laws of nature 
would not have been symmetric under time-translation. 
Unfortunately, many of these RCF counterfactuals seem to be as plausible, or nearly 
as plausible, as their CF counterparts. This looks like a challenge for defenders of 
G=MC; if the RCF counterfactuals are true, and if their truth suffices for causal 
dependence, then we get pervasive two-way grounding dependence. This consequence 
could be used as a reductio of the very idea of metaphysical causation, and 
accordingly (at least for grounding enthusiasts) as a reductio of G=MC. However, 
such a conclusion would be much too hasty. The problem is not specific to 
metaphysical causation, and so it cannot form the basis of an objection to G=MC. 
 
 Similar problems with the truth of reverse counterfactuals afflict counterfactual 
analyses of nomological causation even in the simplest cases. Had the window not 
smashed, it would have been because no brick collided with it. But I am standing 
right by the window. So: had the window not smashed, I would not have thrown the 
brick at it. It is a familiar point that the apparent truth of this latter counterfactual 
should not lead us to conclude that the smashing of the window caused me to throw 
the brick. Any counterfactual account must deal with this problem of causal 
asymmetry somehow or other, and no reason has been given to think that successful 
solutions to the problem will not generalize to the case of metaphysical causation.  
 
The standard way of dealing with the problem of causal asymmetry for 
counterfactual analyses of causation has been to restrict the analysis so as to 
associate causal dependence only with a certain class of counterfactuals, a class that 
does not include the problematic smashing-to-throwing counterfactual. Lewis dubbed 
the problematic counterfactuals back-trackers, and restricted his analysis (Lewis 
1973b/1986) so that only non-back-tracking counterfactuals were sufficient for causal 
dependence. In combination with Lewis’s proposed semantics for non-back-tracking 
counterfactuals in terms of ‘small miracles’ (Lewis 1973a), this account successfully 
excludes the most obvious problem cases17. 
 
                                                 
17 Lewis (1979/1986) tweaked his original semantics to avoid cases like Kit Fineʼs example of 
Nixonʼs button (Fine 1975). The specifics will not concern us here. 
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The word ‘back-trackingʼ does not properly capture what is wrong with the RCF 
reverse metaphysical dependence counterfactuals. Unlike the smashing-to-throwing 
counterfactual, the RCF counterfactuals do not track back in time from the 
(supposed) cause and then forward again to the (supposed) effect; they instead track 
down in the ‘order of being’ from the (supposed) cause and then back up to the 
(supposed) effect. So we might call them down-trackers, using the collective term 
wrong-tracker to cover both back-trackers and down-trackers. If G=MC is on the 
right lines, it suggests that back-tracking and down-tracking are different ways of 
wrong-tracking, and that there is a unified class of non-wrong-tracking (or right-
tracking) counterfactuals which sustain genuine relationships of causal dependence. 
We can test this hypothesis by considering a curious feature of back-trackers, 
described by Lewis as a ‘syntactic peculiarity’: 
Back-tracking counterfactuals, used in a context that favors their truth, 
are marked by a syntactic peculiarity. They are the ones in which the 
usual subjunctive conditional constructions are readily replaced by more 
complicated constructions: “If it were that... then it would have to be that 
...” or the like. 
Lewis (1979) p.458 
This feature is also had by down-tracking counterfactuals. The RCF counterfactuals 
listed above are indeed more idiomatically posed with the more complicated forms 
Lewis refers to. If Socratesʼs singleton had not existed, then it would have to have 
been that Socrates didnʼt exist; if ¬¬P hadnʼt been true, P could not have been true 
either; if energy had not been a conserved quantity, the laws of nature would have 
had to have been non-symmetric under time-translations. The CF counterfactuals, in 
contrast, are if anything less felicitous when posed in these more complicated forms 
and certainly do not gain in felicity to the same extent. To my ears at least, “If act A 
had not had the best consequences, it would have had to have not been right” seems 
to introduce a complication that is irrelevant to the thought being expressed. 
 
An adequate counterfactual analysis of causation must provide a natural, 
informative and non-ad-hoc characterization of right-tracking counterfactuals. In the 
case of nomological causation, we could try to pick out right-trackers by reference to 
time variables somehow associated with the antecedent and the consequent; we 
simply specify that the antecedent-time must be earlier than the consequent-time. 
This move is already unattractive in the case of nomological causation, because it 
rules out causal loops, but it is transparently hopeless in the case of metaphysical 
causation. We (perhaps!) have a grasp on an eventʼs temporal location that is 
independent of nomological causal facts about it; we lack any grasp of the level of a 
fact in the order of being that is independent of grounding facts about it.  
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Lewis hoped to avoid making the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual 
dependence (and hence of causal dependence) into a necessary truth about causation. 
Instead, he hoped to exclude back-trackers by appeal to large-scale features of worlds 
like ours, which he thought would infect back-trackers with widespread 
indeterminacy (Lewis 1979/1986). If I had not flicked the switch, the light would not 
have gone on. This counterfactual is determinately true: the closest antecedent-
worlds will all be pretty similar, and in none of them the light goes on anyway. But 
the reverse counterfactual, Lewis argued, is not determinately true. A wide variety of 
alternative courses of events might well have given rise to the light not going on; my 
not flicking, a power cut, a blown bulb, a loose connection. The closest antecedent 
worlds are diverse, and there will be very little true at them all. 
 
Will anything like this Lewisian indeterminacy-based manoeuvre work to 
distinguish right-tracking from wrong-tracking counterfactuals in full generality? No: 
even if it were successful in the case of nomological causation (and it is not18), the 
manoeuvre would not carry over to the case of metaphysical causation. The 
asymmetry of traces in the actual world, as we have learned from thermal physics, is 
intimately tied to the monotonic increase in entropy in closed macroscopic systems. 
But there is apparently no physical basis for any asymmetry of traces in the 
metaphysical order of being, no physical quantity which is determined in a lawlike 
way to be greater for a grounding entity than for the grounded entity. Absent any 
independent reason to believe reality has the relevant feature, the Lewisian 
indeterminacy-based manoeuvre does not get off the ground. 
 
One possible response to the difficulties with characterizing right-tracking is to 
capitulate, and to give up the goal of analyzing causation in non-causal terms. We 
could characterize the right-tracking counterfactuals as those where the consequent is 
causally dependent on the antecedent. Any resulting counterfactual theory of 
causation would then be so uninformative that it could scarcely qualify as an 
analysis; but perhaps this is the best we can do.  Giving up in this way on the 
project of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and thereby ʻtaking causation as 
primitiveʼ, would not undermine G=MC. It would not threaten the analogy between 
grounding and nomological causation emphasized throughout the paper, and it would 
not vitiate the theoretical benefits of identifying grounding with metaphysical 
causation set out in §1. However, in the remainder of this paper I will focus on a 
more ambitious approach to analyzing causation: the interventionist approach 
associated with Woodward (2003), Hitchcock (2001), and Pearl (2009). 
 
                                                 
18 Elga (2001) has persuasively argued that the asymmetry-of-traces account is hopeless. 
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Unlike the Lewisian approach, interventionism does not comprise a full reduction 
of causation to counterfactual dependence, but it is still a form of counterfactual 
theory since it involves a non-trivial “systematic connection between causal claims 
and certain counterfactuals” (Woodward 2003, p. 70). As with Lewisʼs theory, the 
counterfactual dependencies sufficient for causation must be restricted in order to 
prevent wrong-trackers from giving rise to spurious causation. To encode the 
distinction between right-trackers and wrong-trackers, interventionists make use of 
causal models consisting of a set of variables, a set of structural equations relating 
values of the variables, and an assignment of actual values to variables. The 
distinction between right-tracking and wrong-tracking counterfactuals is then derived 
in the interventionist framework from a distinction between appropriate and 
inappropriate causal models. Right-tracking counterfactuals are those with 
antecedents specifying some combination of interventions on model variables in some 
appropriate model, and with consequents specifying some values for other model 
variables in that model.  
 
Interventionists do not offer any independent characterization of appropriateness; 
an appropriate model is just one which correctly captures the causal structure of the 
situation modelled. This non-reductive approach is of course controversial; my claim 
is simply that such a move is no less plausible in the case of metaphysical causation 
than it is in the case of nomological causation. One possible deflationary 
interpretation of the project of non-reductive analysis reads it as offering not a single 
non-directed analysis but as offering a disjunction of two analyses; either 
appropriateness is reductively analysed in terms of causation, or causation is 
reductively analysed in terms of appropriateness, but the interventionist declines to 
commit herself to which analysis is correct and commits herself only to the 
disjunction. This understanding of interventionism is likewise just as applicable to 
the case of metaphysical causation as it is to the case of nomological causation. 
 
 The reliance on appropriate models is key to the way in which interventionists 
distinguish sufficient causes from contributory causes, and hence to the way in which 
full grounds will be distinguished from partial grounds in light of G=MC. What is a 
sufficient cause according to one causal model might be different from what is a 
sufficient cause according to a more complex causal model that incorporates 
additional variables. Accordingly, interventionist verdicts both about sufficient 
causes and about full grounds rely on a judicious choice of appropriate model. There 
are various attitudes one could take to this situation—one could hold that sufficiency 
is model-relative and that choice of models is a pragmatic business, or that verdicts 
of sufficiency are correct only if validated by some ‘one true causal model’ for the 
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whole of reality, or that a model is appropriate if no inclusion of additional variables 
undermines the model’s verdicts about sufficiency. Since these problems arise just as 
forcefully for interventionist approaches to nomological causation as they do for 
interventionist approaches to metaphysical causation, I will set them aside. 
 
 The reliance on appropriate models is likewise key to the interventionist response 
to worries about causal proportionality. Whether CF-Mind/Body is true depends on 
which model is appropriate, and in particular on whether interventions on the 
physical state variable in the appropriate model give rise to radically different or 
merely slightly different physical states. While there is no standard solution to this 
problem—see Yablo (1992) for discussion and Woodward (2008) for an 
interventionist treatment of proportionality—we can again set the issue aside for 
present purposes since it applies with equal force to cases of nomological causation 
and to cases of metaphysical causation. Any adequate interventionist treatment of 
proportionality for nomological causation will carry over to an adequate treatment of 
proportionality for metaphysical causation. 
 
 The notion of an intervention does a lot of work for interventionists. It in effect 
plays the role allotted to small miracles in the Lewisian semantics for right-tracking 
counterfactuals, the role of specifying that the antecedent be realized in a way which 
does not ‘drag along’ unwanted causal history. An intervention is a ‘clean’ alteration 
of the value of a particular variable that does not affect the values of upstream 
causal variables: for example, an intervention on the reading of a barometer leaves 
unchanged both the pressure in the room and the barometer’s own causal origins. It 
is immediately apparent that interventionism does not offer a reductive theory of 
causation, since the notion of an intervention is explicitly causal. Nonetheless, 
interventionists typically maintain that their account is still informative because it 
shows us how various distinct causal claims are conceptually connected to one 
another. Interventionism will deliver verdicts about specific causal dependencies once 
we have specified a causal model, even though there is no algorithm for building 
causal models which does not itself appeal to causal judgments. By applying the 
interventionist analysis to grounding construed as metaphysical causation, we might 
accordingly hope to derive some interesting and informative results about the 
relation of different grounding claims to one another. 
 
If the non-reductive approach to explicating causation is worthwhile in the case 
of nomological causation, then it ought also to be worthwhile in the case of 
metaphysical causation. In the next section, I will show how the approach handles 
familiar cases of grounding, by exploring a selection of metaphysical causal models. 
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5. Metaphysical Causal Models 
From an interventionist perspective, the counterfactual dependencies involved in 
metaphysical causation will be underwritten by a particular metaphysical causal 
model. This section describes causal models for four kinds of case from the causation 
literature, offers metaphysical causal models with the same structure, and discusses 
some interpretive problems that arise. 
 
The metaphysical causal models presented below help us in at least two ways. 
Firstly, the models reflect a range of potential patterns of metaphysical causation; 
this illustrates the flexibility of an approach to grounding based on G=MC. 
Secondly, the models correspond to metaphysical versions of well-known puzzle cases 
from the causation literature; this further reinforces the analogy between grounding 
and nomological causation by showing that that the same theoretical pressures arise 
for analyses of both notions. The models include cases (omission and double 
prevention) that motivate Hallʼs distinction between causal production and causal 
dependence (Hall 2004), as well as cases (symmetric overdetermination and early pre-
emption) that have often been raised as counterexamples to simple counterfactual 
theories of causation but which can be handled by the interventionist approach19. 
 
Each model, formally speaking, consists of a set of variables representing features 
of reality, a set of structural equations linking the values of the variables according 
to the causal structure of reality, and an assignment function specifying which values 
the variables actually take. We may think of each variable as a question, and of the 
possible values of each variable as the various possible answers to that question 
(Briggs 2012a). Variables may in general be either discrete (whether Socrates exists) 
or continuous (how tall Socrates is). The facts that ground and are grounded, in this 
framework for modelling metaphysical causation, are thus identified with question-
answer pairs: think of them, if you like, as ʻthe fact that A is the correct answer to 
Qʼ. For yes/no questions we conventionally assign values of 1 for ʻyesʼ, 0 for ʻnoʼ. 
 
The structural equations of a causal model are written in the form A=f(B,C, 
D...). It is important to note that this ʻ=ʼ does not denote identity, or indeed any 
symmetric relation. Instead it expresses the counterfactual dependence of A on a 
function of some other variables. Thus, each causal model encodes a set of 
counterfactual dependencies: if B, C, D were set to specific values by an intervention, 
                                                 
19 Interventionists claim significant advantages over other counterfactual theories of causation 
with respect to these cases. See Woodward (2003) for an interventionist treatment of pre-
emption in both its early and late varieties (p.77-81), and for an interventionist treatment of 
symmetric overdetermination (p.83-84). 
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A would take a specific value. This central role played by counterfactual claims in 
the interventionist framework is what marks it out as part of the broad tradition of 
counterfactual approaches to causation. For the standard philosophical account of 
interventionist counterfactuals, see Woodward (2003 p.59-61); for detailed 
explorations of their semantics, see Briggs (2012a) and Santorio (MS). 
 
Now that we have encountered the structural equations of a model, we can use 
them to characterize the notion of a mediating principle that was introduced in §1. 
Mediating principles are general facts that determine which structural equations are 
part of an appropriate model. In other words, they are those general facts upon 
which the relationship between values of variables in an appropriate model depends. 
Each of them is a (perhaps partial) answer to the question: why is this equation part 
of an appropriate model of this situation? Sometimes a full answer to such questions 
will require citing laws of nature, sometimes it will not: in the former case we have 
nomological causation, and in the latter case metaphysical causation. 
 
I here assume that we can clearly enough identify which causal dependencies are 
mediated by laws of nature to draw the intended distinction between nomological 
and metaphysical causation, at least in paradigm cases. If the nomic/non-nomic 
distinction has borderline cases, then there will be borderline cases between 
nomological causation and metaphysical causation. And, if (as contemporary 
Humeans maintain) the notion of a law of nature does not run metaphysically deep, 
then the distinction between nomological causation and metaphysical causation will 
likewise fail to run deep. None of this presents any problem for G=MC. 
 
My proposed way of distinguishing between types of causation itself makes use of 
the ideology of causation, by invoking the dependence of a model’s structural 
equations on the mediating principles. However, any circularity here is benign. We 
are not explaining causation itself in causal terms, but merely using it to help us 
draw additional, finer-grained, distinctions. We can go on to apply our demarcation 
criterion to the envisaged dependence of structural equations on mediating principles; 
that further dependence will typically be classified as metaphysical causation. 
 
If the reader remains unpersuaded by my proposed characterization of 
metaphysical causation in terms of the nomic status of mediating principles, there 
remains a less ambitious alternative compatible with G=MC. This alternative is to 
regard the distinction between metaphysical and nomological causation as primitive, 
not characterizable in independent terms. The majority of my arguments would be 
unaffected, although the argument from ideological parsimony of §1 would lapse. 
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The structural equations and assignment function of a causal model may be 
partially represented by a directed graph with actual variable values at nodes. (The 
causal modelling literature, being oriented towards practical applications, tends to 
ignore possible cases of causal loops by requiring the graphs also to be acyclic.) Such 
graphical visualizations, while heuristically useful, leave out important aspects of the 
structure of causal models: they do not represent the alternative values a variable 
could have taken, or the details of complex dependencies between variable values. 
Accordingly, many distinct causal models may be represented by a single directed 
acyclic graph, so we will also need to provide a full set of structural equations to 
properly characterize our metaphysical causal models. In the following examples, the 
structural equations and assignments (and hence the visual representations) are held 
fixed as we move from examples of nomological causation to examples of 
metaphysical causation; only the interpretation of the variables changes. 
 
The simplest possible kind of case of causation involves one fact’s obtaining 
because another fact obtains:  
Simple: Window 
Variables 
C: Whether Suzy throws the rock 




 C=1; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
C=1 → E=1 
Models with this structure also describe straightforward cases of grounding: 
Simple: Singleton 
C: Whether Socrates exists 
E: Whether Singleton Socrates exists 
Simple: Colour 
C: Whether the brick is red 
E: Whether the brick is coloured 
Our second kind of case, causation by omission, involves a dependence of the 
effect (here, the fact that the plant dies) on some other factʼs not obtaining (here, on 
my failure to water the plant.) The plant dies because I do not water it.  
Omission: Dessication 
Variables 
C: Whether I water the plant 
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 C=0; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
C=0 → E=1 
Cases of causation by omission play a prominent role in the causation literature: Hall 
(2004) appeals to them in defending his influential distinction between dependence 
and production, and they drove Lewis to deny that causation is a relation at all 
(Lewis 2004). Examples of grounding with the same structure are easy to find. Here 
are two: the set of unicorns is empty because it is not the case that unicorns exist, 
and the proposition that 1+1=3 is false because it is not the case that 1+1=3. 
Omission: Unicorns 
Variables 
C: Whether unicorns exist 
E: Whether the set of unicorns is empty 
Omission: Falsehood 
Variables 
C: Whether it is the case that 1+1=3 
E: Whether the proposition that 1+1=3 is false 
 Cases of causal overdetermination are interesting because they challenge simple 
counterfactual analyses. We can distinguish symmetrically overdetermined causation 
(where both causes, intuitively, ʻtake eﬀectʼ) from pre-emption (where one potential 
cause is prevented from taking effect by the action of another). A familiar and 
gruesome example of symmetrical overdetermination is the firing squad: 
Symmetric Overdetermination: Firing Squad 
Variables 
A: Whether guard A fires 
B: Whether guard B fires 




 A=1; B=1; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
A=1 ↘   
   E=1 
B=1 ↗  
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Symmetrically overdetermined grounding is commonplace. The presence of arsenic 
and the presence of strychnine each suffice to make a potion poisonous, and the truth 
of P and the truth of Q each suffice for the truth of their disjunction: 
Symmetric Overdetermination: Poison 
Variables 
A: Whether the potion contains 1 gram of arsenic 
B: Whether the potion contains 1 gram of strychnine 
E: Whether the potion is poisonous 
Symmetric Overdetermination: Disjunction 
Variables 
A: Whether P is the case 
B: Whether Q is the case 
E: Whether P⋁Q is the case 
As well as further illustrating the commonality between nomological causation and 
grounding, symmetrical overdetermination cases help us to see how the 
interventionist framework handles the second kind of problem for counterfactual 
approaches to grounding raised on p.16. In cases of symmetric overdetermination, the 
appropriate interventionist model contains variables corresponding to both 
overdetermining causes. If one of these variables is left out of the model, then the 
interventionist apparatus will fail to deliver the correct causal verdicts. 
 
 To check for a causal dependency between two variables A and E in symmetric 
overdetermination cases, we look for some variable B on which we can intervene and 
hold fixed so as to give rise to a counterfactual dependence of E on A (see 
Woodward 2003, p.82 for further discussion of interventionist treatments of 
symmetric overdetermination). However, if one of the overdetermining causes is not 
represented in the model, then there will be no such variable B that can be held 
fixed in the antecedent of the model’s interventionist counterfactuals. Consequently, 
no interventionist counterfactual encoded by the model will characterize E as 
depending on interventions on A, and we obtain the wrong causal verdict. Once 
again, interventionism here relies on a distinction, which is not reductively analysed, 
between appropriate and inappropriate causal models of a situation: an appropriate 
model is one that contains all the relevant causal variables. The interventionist 
framework is accordingly non-reductive, but (as I argued in the previous section) this 
feature is no more problematic for the application of interventionism to metaphysical 
causation than it is for the application of interventionism to nomological causation. 
 
 In causal pre-emption cases, a potential cause is prevented from taking effect by 
the triggering of a causal chain leading to the effect via a different route. In the 
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causation literature, it is common to distinguish early pre-emption, where the pre-
empted cause does not occur, from late pre-emption where the pre-empted cause 
occurs but the causal chain it triggers does not run to completion; here we will only 
need to consider early pre-emption. In the following typical case of early pre-
emption, Kangarooʼs eating of a tasty shrub is pre-empted by Wombatʼs: 
 Early Pre-emption: Marsupials 
Variables 
C: Whether Wombat bites into the plant 
P: Whether Wombat swallows the plant 
Q: Whether Kangaroo sees the plant 
R: Whether Kangaroo eats the plant 






 C=1; P=1; Q=1; R=0; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
C=1 → P=1 → E=1 
 ↘  ↗  
Q=1 → R=0   
 
 Cases of grounding early pre-emption tend to involve one metaphysical principle 
trumping another. In the following examples, the presence and arrangement of my 
particles trumps the presence and arrangement of a subset of them in constituting a 
person20, and the legal circumstances according to which a crime counts as a murder 
trump the circumstances according to which it counts as an assault: 
Early Pre-emption: Constitution 
Variables 
C: Whether my particles are arranged me-wise here. 
P: Whether there is a person with exactly ten fingers here. 
Q: Whether a subset of my particles are arranged me-without-a-little-finger-wise. 
R: Whether there is a person with exactly nine fingers here. 
E: Whether there is a person here. 
Early Pre-emption: Crime 
C: Whether the aggressor unlawfully and premeditatedly killed the victim. 
                                                 
20 This, at least, is the grounding scenario apparently envisaged by defenders of solutions to 
the problem of the many according to which objects are maximal on any given precisification, 
as in the view of Lewis (1993). See also Sider (2001). 
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P: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of murder. 
Q: Whether the aggressor unlawfully physically attacked the victim. 
R: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of assault. 
E: Whether the aggressor should be found guilty of a crime. 
 A final type of causal model deserves to be mentioned. The models described 
above each involve either nomological causation or metaphysical causation, but we 
can combine the two sorts of causal link to produce ʻmixedʼ causal models that seem 
quite unproblematic. In the following example, the trajectory of the cricket ball and 
the rules of cricket conspire to cause the fact that the batsmanʼs team is all out: 
Early Pre-emption: Cricket Wicket 
Variables 
C: Whether the batsman catches the ball. 
P: Whether the batsman should be given out handled the ball. 
Q: Whether the ball approaches the wicket. 
R: Whether the ball strikes the wicket. 
E: Whether the batting team is all out. 
These mixed cases provide additional support for G=MC. Where some causal chain 
includes both grounding and causal links—as when the ball is delivered, strikes the 
wicket, and the rules determine that the batsman is out—we are unhesitating in our 
judgment that the delivery of the ball caused the batsman to be out. It is of no 
consequence to our intuitive judgments that a grounding link is an essential 
component of the causal chain; and this is just what G=MC would predict. 
 
6. Impossible Interventions and the Classification of Causation 
 So far, so good. But a concern has been deferred from §4: the notion of an 
intervention may well seem problematic in the grounding context. How can we make 
sense of an intervention on any variable which has its value of metaphysical 
necessity? Intervening on a variable like C in the Falsehood model is metaphysically 
impossible. And how can we make sense of an intervention on a variable which has 
its value metaphysically necessitated by an upstream variable?  Intervening on a 
variable like E in the Falsehood model generates a metaphysically impossible 
scenario in which 1+1=3 but the proposition that 1+1=3 is false. 
 
 Interventionists have tended to apply a constraint such as the following to the 
variables within a causal model21:  
                                                 
21 Weslake (forthcoming) and Woodward (2015) use constraints of this sort as part of their 
interventionist solutions to the causal exclusion problem. Along similar lines, Bennett (2003) 
argues that two causes do not causally overdetermine an effect if one cause metaphysically 
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Independent Manipulability:  It is metaphysically possible that every proper subset of 
the variables in [a causal model] be set to every combination of their possible values by 
independent interventions 
Weslake (forthcoming) 
Independent Manipulability is not compatible with an interventionist treatment of 
metaphysical causation. No metaphysically possible intervention can give rise to a 
metaphysically impossible state of affairs. And on the common assumption that full 
grounds metaphysically necessitate their effects (see §2), interventions on variable 
values that leave upstream variables unchanged give rise to metaphysically 
impossible states of affairs. Advocates of G=MC should embrace this consequence: 
metaphysical causation is inextricably bound up with counterpossible dependence, as 
I argue in a companion paper (A. Wilson forthcoming). The appeal to metaphysically 
impossible interventions is a feature, not a bug, in the present account of grounding. 
 
 I am proposing that in the light of G=MC we ought to abandon Independent 
Manipulability in the grounding context, and accordingly we ought to deny that 
Independent Manipulability is a fully general requirement on causal models. 
Interventionists ought not restrict themselves to considering only metaphysically 
possible interventions. However, a principle like Independent Manipulability may still 
have a valuable subsidiary role to play: it might hold for the nomological causation 
that interventionists have aimed to model, yet fail for metaphysical causation. Such 
a supposition would allow us to continue to use the Independent Manipulability 
requirement to guard against widespread nomological causal overdetermination, 
without undermining the interventionist treatment of metaphysical causation. 
  
 These considerations concerning the modal status of interventions can potentially 
be exploited to distinguish in a more fine-grained way among sub-species of 
causation. On this line of thought, physical causation would be a type of nomological 
causation mediated by the laws of physics; accordingly, some interventions on the 
appropriate model will be physically impossible. Biological causation, by contrast, 
would be a type of nomological causation mediated by laws of biology but not by 
laws of physics; accordingly, intervening on the appropriate model would be 
physically possible but biologically impossible. Psychological causation would be a 
type of nomological causation mediated by psychological laws, with interventions on 
                                                                                                                                           
necessitates the other. Although I cannot tackle the exclusion problem here, any widespread 
causal overdetermination resulting from G=MC ought not to worry us. Common sense may 
tell us that events are not systematically overdetermined with respect to nomological 
causation, but it does not tell us that events are not systematically overdetermined with 
respect to causation in general. 
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the appropriate model being biologically possible but psychologically impossible; and 
so on. Generally, for every distinct type of law of nature L that we countenance, we 
can characterize a corresponding species of nomological causation—L-causation—
such that L-dependencies are mediated by L-laws and the interventions involved give 
rise to L-impossible scenarios that are nonetheless possible in some wider sense. 
 
 A similar strategy can be used to classify different varieties of metaphysical 
causation. Perhaps logical grounding is a type of causation mediated by logical laws 
or valid rules of inference; perhaps mereological grounding is a type of causation 
mediated by laws of mereology; perhaps set-theoretic grounding is a type of 
causation mediated by axioms of set theory. I have only been able to sketch the 
resulting classification scheme here, but I hope that this sketch still goes some way 
towards illustrating the potential theoretical fruitfulness of G=MC. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 We are now in a position to draw together the various strings of the grounding-
physical causation analogy and to sum up the overall case for G=MC. Grounding 
and nomological causation are alike in the following respects: 
 Grounding comes in flavours—full ground, partial ground—that are exactly 
analogous to the notions of sufficient cause and of contributory cause. (§2) 
 Both the relations of (strict partial) grounding and nomological causation are 
ordinarily thought to form a partial order. (§2) 
 Transitivity and asymmetry have been challenged for both grounding and 
nomological causation by appeal to structurally similar types of cases, and 
analogous responses are available. (§2) 
 Both grounds and nomological causes can be informatively cited in 
explanations. (§2) 
 Grounding and nomological causation stand in the same general relations to 
laws, necessity and inference. (§2) 
 The projects of reducing each notion to counterfactuals face structurally 
similar problems with wrong-tracking counterfactuals. (§4) 
 Both grounding and nomological causation are closely associated with 
distinctive patterns of one-way counterfactual dependence. (§5) 
 Analogous puzzle cases challenge counterfactual analyses of each notion. (§5) 
 A generalized interventionist approach can be applied to both notions, 
providing in each case an account which is non-reductive but potentially still 
informative and which handles the main puzzle cases. (§5) 
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My case for G=MC rests upon this systematic analogy, upon the benefits of G=MC 
(described in §1) with respect to ideological parsimony and to the grounding-
explanation connection, and upon the coherence of mixed causal models (§5). G=MC 
makes sense of how we understand and assess grounding claims, and of the role they 
play in our metaphysical theorizing. When combined with an interventionist 
approach to causation and with a semantics for interventionist counterfactuals which 
allows for non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity, G=MC delivers sensible 
verdicts over a wide variety of cases.22 
                                                 
22 For helpful discussions and advice over the long gestation of this paper, I am grateful to 
audiences in Birmingham, Oxford, London, Leeds, Brisbane, Rome, Edinburgh, Newark, 
Barcelona, Perth, Big Sky, Chicago and Neuchâtel, and in particular to Dani Adams, Mahrad 
Almotahari, Elizabeth Barnes, Sam Baron, Helen Beebee, Karen Bennett, Ricki Bliss, David 
Braddon-Mitchell, Rachael Briggs, Darragh Byrne, Ross Cameron, Vanessa Carr, Donnchadh 
O’Conaill, Roy Cook, Shamik Dasgupta, Esa Diaz-Leon, Mauro Dorato, Cian Dorr, Julien 
Dutant, Nikk Effingham, Daniel Elstein, Nina Emery, Laura Felline, Kit Fine, Luke Glynn, 
Ned Hall, Thomas Hofweber, Lina Jansson, Nicholas Jones, Alex Kaiserman, Tommy 
Kivatinos, Kathrin Koslicki, Stephan Leuenberger, Dan López de Sa, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Neil 
McDonnell, Elizabeth Miller, Kristie Miller, James Norton, James Otis, Josh Parsons, L.A. 
Paul, Martin Pickup, Oliver Pooley, Denis Robinson, Paolo Santorio, Raul Saucedo, Jonathan 
Schaffer, Jon Shaheen, Alex Silk, Alex Skiles, Aaron Sloman, Scott Sturgeon, Jussi 
Suikkanen, Kirk Surgener, Amie Thomasson, Jonathan Tallant, Tuomas Tahko, Jamie 
Taylor, Jason Turner, Nathan Wildman, Jessica Wilson, Pekka Väyrynen, Robbie Williams, 
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